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Abstract
In the paper, the idea of describing not-yet-verified properties of quantum objects with logical
many-valuedness is scrutinized. As it is argued, to promote such an idea, the following two
foundational problems of many-valued quantum logic must be decided: the problem of choosing
a proper system of many-valued logic and the problem of the emergence of bivalence from logical
many-valuedness. Difficulties accompanying solutions of these problems are discussed.
Keywords: Quantum mechanics; Many-valued logics; Bivalence, Truth-functionality; Truth
values; Quantum logic.
1 Introducing logical many-valuedness in quantum mechanics
The argument claiming that quantum theory could not be comprehended on the grounds of classi-
cal two-valued logic is rather straightforward and goes like this.
Let us consider a typical quantum interference experiment where a quantum particle being released
from a source is absorbed by a screen after passing through a two-slit barrier 1. Suppose that im-
mediately behind that barrier are placed two which-way detectors able to verify (e.g., by way of
clicking) the particle’s passage through a corresponding slit. Let X1 denote the proposition of the
click of the detector placed behind slit 1 such that X1 is true (denoted by “1”) if the detector clicks
and X1 is false (denoted by “0”) if the detector does not. Let X2 in an analogous manner denote
the proposition of the signal from the detector placed behind slit 2.
Assume that the propositions X1 and X2 are in possession of not-yet-verified truth values – i.e.,
ones existing before the detectors can click – that are merely revealed by the act of verification of
the particle’s passage.
Within the given assumption, let us accept that such values of the propositions X1 and X2 are
either 1 or 0. Accordingly, exclusive disjunction on these values of X1 and X2 can be decided by
∗Email : arkadyv@bgu.ac.il
1In the present paper, rather than being strictly restricted to spatially arranged slits, quantum interference is
considered generally for any set of perfectly distinguishable alternatives.
1
X12 ≡ X1 ∨X2 ≡
(
2∨
i=1
Xi
)
∧ ¬
(
2∧
i=1
Xi
)
. (1)
Suppose that the not-yet-verified truth value of the compound proposition X12 is true. Provided
that P is the probability function mapping propositions Y,Z, . . . to the unit interval [0, 1] such
that P[Y ] = 1 if Y is true, P[Y ] = 0 if Y is false, and P[Y ∨ Z] = P [Y ] + P [Z] − P [Y ∧ Z], the
probability of finding the particle at a certain region R on the screen would be then given by the
sum of the patterns P[R|Xi] emerging in setups with a one-slit barrier, namely, P[R|X1 ∨ X2] =
1/2(P[R|X1] + P[R|X2]) (on condition that P[X1] = P[X2]). It would mean that in the said case,
quantum interference would be nonexistent even with none of the detectors present at the slits.
So, by contrast, let us suppose that the not-yet-verified truth value of X12 is false. But then – in
contradiction to the quantum collapse postulate – one would find that it is not true that exactly
one detector will signal if the particle’s passage through the two-slit barrier is observed.
Thus, for the assumption of the not-yet-verified truth values of the propositions Xi to be consistent
with the occurrence of quantum interference and quantum collapse, these truth-values must be
neither 1 nor 0. Such could be only if prior to their verification Xi does not obey the principle “a
proposition is either true or false”, i.e., the principle of bivalence 2.
From the violation of this principle, one can infer that results of future non-certain events can be
described using many-valued logics. For example, consider a 3-valued logic {0, 1/2, 1} which includes
only one additional truth value 1/2 besides the classical ones 0 and 1
3. If not-yet-verified truth
values of the propositions Xi are both
1/2, where the truth value
1/2 is interpreted as “possible” and
the valuations ¬1/2 =
1/2,
1/2 ∨
1/2 =
1/2,
1/2 ∧
1/2 =
1/2 hold, then the truth value of the compound
proposition X12 can be ascertained as (
1/2 ∨
1/2) ∧ ¬(
1/2 ∧
1/2) =
1/2, i.e., also “possible”. In this case,
before the verification one can only assert that the both statements – the particle passes through
exactly one slit and the particle passes through more than one slit – are possible.
Attractive as it might seem, the idea of describing not-yet-verified properties of quantum objects
with many-valued logics is burdened with two foundational problems.
The first is the problem of choosing a proper system of many-valued logic. It concerns with the
following question: Because there are infinitely many systems of many-valued logic, which of them
should be chosen for the quantum mechanical description? How can a specific system be decided
on to avoid a charge of arbitrariness?
Notwithstanding the significance of the first problem, the next one seems even more serious: When
2Obviously, it is possible to avoid this conclusion merely by accepting nonlocal realism (i.e., an interpretation of
quantum theory in terms of ‘hidden variables’ such as Bohmian mechanics [1, 2, 3]). But in doing so one would
confront with additional deficiencies that plague the ‘hidden variables’ approach (the analysis of those deficiencies
can be found, e.g., in [4, 5]).
3That might be such three-valued logical systems as the Kleene (strong) logic K3 or the 3-valued  Lukasiewicz
system [6, 7].
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the act of the verification is finished in the macrophysical domain (and so the path the particle has
taken is known with certainty), the propositions Xi conform to the principle of bivalence. So, unless
one can demonstrate that a many-valued logic has a proper application to the objects of everyday
macrophysical experience (and for this reason our logic needs revising), the following question must
be answered: How do not-yet-verified multivalent truth values become classical bivalent truth values?
The discussion of these foundational problems of many-valued quantum logic is offered in the
present paper.
2 Preliminaries
We will start by briefly introducing a few necessary preliminaries.
Let us consider a complete lattice L = (L,⊔,⊓) containing any partially ordered set L where each
two-element subset {y, z} ⊆ L has a join (i.e., a least upper bound) and a meet (i.e., a greatest
lower bound) defined by y ⊔ z ≡ l.u.b.(y, z) and y ⊓ z ≡ g.l.b.(y, z), correspondingly. In addition to
the binary operations ⊔ and ⊓, let the lattice L contain a unary operation ∼ defined in a manner
that L is closed under this operation and ∼ is an involution, explicitly, ∼y ∈ L if y ∈ L and
∼(∼y) = y.
Let
§VN (⋄) = [[⋄]]v , (2)
where the symbol ⋄ can be replaced by any proposition associated with a property of a physical
system, refer to a valuation, i.e., a mapping from a set of propositions being as stated denoted by
S = {⋄} to a set VN = {v} where v are truth-values ranging from 0 to 1 and N is the cardinality
of the set {v}:
§VN : S → VN . (3)
At the same time, let us assume a homomorphism f : L → S such that there is a truth-function
v that maps each lattice element denoted by the symbol ∗ to the truth value of the corresponding
proposition, namely,
v(∗) = [[⋄]]v , (4)
basing on the following principles:
v(y) = 0 if y = 0L , (5)
v(y) = 1 if y = 1L , (6)
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where 0L and 1L are the least and the greatest elements of the lattice, correspondingly. These
principles imply that the least and the greatest lattice elements are identified with always false and
always true propositions.
Let the following valuation apply for the negation of a proposition Y :
v(∼y) = [[¬Y ]]v . (7)
On the other hand, the valuation [[¬Y ]]v can be decided through the truth degree function F¬ of
negation, that is,
[[¬Y ]]v = F¬([[Y ]]v) . (8)
As stated by [6], the most basic example for F¬ is 1− [[Y ]]v (called  Lukasiewicz negation). To meet
this version of negation, let us assume
v(∼y) = 1− v(y) . (9)
Also, let the following valuational axioms apply for the binary operations on lattice elements y and
z related to simultaneously verifiable propositions Y and Z:
v(y ⊔ z) = [[Y ∨Z]]v , (10)
v(y ⊓ z) = [[Y ∧Z]]v . (11)
From another side, the truth values of disjunction and conjunction on the values of the propositions
Y and Z can be decided by
[[Y ∨Z]]v = F∨([[Y ]]v, [[Z]]v) , (12)
[[Y ∧Z]]v = F∧([[Y ]]v, [[Z]]v) , (13)
where F∨ and F∧ are the truth degree functions of the corresponding logical connectives.
4
4 In [8], the relation between the functions v(y ⊔ z) and F∨
(
[[Y ]]
v
, [[Z]]
v
)
as well as v(y ⊓ z) and F∧
(
[[Y ]]
v
, [[Z]]
v
)
is studied to examine whether  Lukasiewicz operations can also be used to model conjunctions and disjunctions. As
it is stated in the paper,  Lukasiewicz disjunction and conjunction coincide with the truth-functions of joins and
meets, namely, v(y ⊔ z) = min {v(y) + v(z), 1} and v(y ⊓ z) = max {v(y) + v(z)− 1, 0}, whenever these  Lukasiewicz
connectives can be defined.
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As it has been already noted in the Section 1, were the simultaneously verifiable propositions Xi
to possess not-yet-verified truth-values consistent with the occurrence of quantum interference and
quantum collapse, they would have to meet the requirement {v(xi)} 6= {0, 1}, where xi are the lat-
tice elements attributed to the propositions Xi such that v(xi) = [[Xi]]v. But together with that, af-
ter the verification, the truth-values of Xi would have to conform to bivalence, i.e., {v(xi)} = {0, 1}.
Consequently, the question is, how to combine in one theory those two mutually exclusive condi-
tions on {v(xi)}?
3 Many-valued quantum logic
A solution to this problem can be motivated by recalling that the total of all the individual proba-
bilities equals 1, so, when one of the probabilities turns into 1, all the others become 0. Let us add
some details to this idea 5.
Assume that there is a correspondence (homomorphism) between a lattice L = (L,⊔,⊓) and a
family L(H) containing all closed, ordered by the subset relation subspaces of a (separable) Hilbert
space H associated with a physical system under investigation. Explicitly, the inclusion relation
between the lattice elements corresponds to the subset relation between the closed subspaces, the
lattice meet ⊓ corresponds to the intersection ∩ of those subspaces and the lattice join ⊔ is the
closed span of their union ∪, the least element of the lattice is the {0} subspace and the greatest
element of the lattice is the identical subspace H.
Consider self-adjoint projection operators Pˆ⋄ on H that represent propositions ⋄ declaring that the
system possesses experimentally verifiable properties (such as a path that the particle takes getting
through the barrier). Since each projection operator Pˆ⋄ leaves invariant any vector lying in its
range, ran(Pˆ⋄), and annihilates any vector lying in its null space, ker(Pˆ⋄), giving in this manner
a decomposition of H into two complementary closed subspaces, namely, H = ran(Pˆ⋄) ⊕ ker(Pˆ⋄),
there is a one-one correspondence between the subspaces ran(Pˆ⋄) and projection operators Pˆ⋄.
Therefore, one can consider Pˆ⋄ as the elements of L(H).
In view of the homomorphism between L = (L,⊔,⊓) and L(H), the principles of calculus of truth
values presented above are expected to survive the passage to compatible elements of L(H). For
this reason, one can put forward that
v(Pˆx) = [[X]]v , (14)
5 In fact, this idea – called many-valued quantum logic or fuzzy quantum logic – has already been developed in a
series of papers [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]; however, for the aim of this discussion, it is not necessary to follow those papers
precisely. Also, for the discussion it is immaterial to present in its entirety the generally accepted interpretation of
the elements of a quantum logic – an interested reader can be referred to any textbook on quantum logic: see, for
example, [15] or [16].
5
where v(Pˆx) is a truth-function value at projection operator Pˆx which corresponds to a truth value
of proposition X.
Suppose that the state of the system is characterized by the unit vector |Ψ〉. It is not difficult to see
that the truth-value of the proposition X will coincide with the eigenvalue of the projection opera-
tor Pˆx, namely, {v(Pˆx)} = {0, 1}, if and only if the given vector |Ψ〉 lies in either ran(Pˆx) or ker(Pˆx).
However, if |Ψ〉 is such a unit vector in H that |Ψ〉 6∈ ran(Pˆx) as well as |Ψ〉 6∈ ker(Pˆx), one can
only get {〈Ψ|Pˆx|Ψ〉} = {x¯ ∈ R | 0 < x¯ < 1}, where x¯ is the expected value of the observable
x corresponding to the operator Pˆx. Consistent with the orthodox quantum theory, the value
〈Ψ|Pˆx|Ψ〉 can be interpreted as the probability that the measurement of the observable x will
produce the “affirmative” answer 1 in the state of the system given by |Ψ〉, i.e.,
P[x = 1] ≡ 〈Ψ|Pˆx|Ψ〉 . (15)
But, as stated by the idea being discussed here, the value 〈Ψ|Pˆx|Ψ〉 should be also regarded as the
not-yet-verified truth value of the proposition X, namely,
v(Pˆx) = 〈Ψ|Pˆx|Ψ〉 . (16)
Accordingly, if |Ψ〉 is any unit vector in H, then {v(Pˆx)} = {x¯ ∈ R | 0 ≤ x¯ ≤ 1} which can be inter-
preted as a generalization of the Boolean domain V2 = {0, 1}. In this fashion, the value 〈Ψ|Pˆx|Ψ〉
represents the degree to which the proposition X is true prior to the verification (i.e., before the
experiment designed to verify the affirmative answer can be completed) 6.
4 Truth-values vs. probabilities
Let us analyze the appropriateness of the hypothesis (16).
Firstly, consider the rationale behind it. Suppose that a quantum system is prepared in a pure
normalized state |Ψ〉 that lies in the range of the projection operator Pˆx. Being in the state |Ψ〉 is
subject to the assumption that the truth-value function v must assign the truth value 1 to the propo-
sition X and, in consequence, to the operator Pˆx, namely, |Ψ〉 ∈ ran(Pˆx) =⇒ v(Pˆx) = [[X]]v = 1,
since Pˆx|Ψ〉 = 1 · |Ψ〉. But what is more, in this case, the affirmative answer for the measurement
of the observable x will have probability 1 since 〈Ψ|Pˆx|Ψ〉 = 1. In an analogous manner, if the
system is prepared in a pure state |Ψ〉 lying in the null space of the projection operator Pˆx, then the
function v must assign the truth value 0 to Pˆx, namely, |Ψ〉 ∈ ker(Pˆx) =⇒ v(Pˆx) = [[X]]v = 0, since
Pˆx|Ψ〉 = 0 · |Ψ〉. In that case, the probability of the affirmative answer must be 0 as 〈Ψ|Pˆx|Ψ〉 = 0.
From here on can infer that the truth-function v(Pˆx) and the probability-function P[x = 1] agree
6At the same time, v(∼ Pˆx) = 1− 〈Ψ|Pˆx|Ψ〉 represents the degree to which the not-yet-verified truth value of the
proposition X is not true (that is, the degree to which the system does not possess the mentioned property prior to
the verification).
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if |Ψ〉 ∈ ran(Pˆx) or |Ψ〉 ∈ ker(Pˆx).
It is tempting to conclude that the agreement
v(Pˆx) = P[x = 1] (17)
holds even in the case where |Ψ〉 /∈ ran(Pˆx) and |Ψ〉 /∈ ker(Pˆx). Sadly, such a conclusion is open to
some considerable objections.
First, the equality (17) is too strong from the mathematical point of view. Namely, the fact that
two outputs of the functions v(Pˆx) and P[x = 1] coincide does not mean that these functions have
the same codomain. The failure of bivalence {v(Pˆx)} 6= {0, 1} only suggests that the set of all
permitted outputs to the truth-function v(Pˆx) may contains more than two values. That is, v(Pˆx)
might be infinite-valued and yet different from P[x = 1] in any state |Ψ〉 where |Ψ〉 /∈ ran(Pˆx) and
|Ψ〉 /∈ ker(Pˆx).
Second, from the conceptual point of view, the equality (17) is strong as well given that it is not
conceptually neutral. That is, the pertinence of this equality to quantum theory strongly depends
on the interpretation of the state vector |Ψ〉. This means that the equality (17) can be applicable
only if the vector |Ψ〉 posits the “true states of reality”, i.e., the ontic states of the quantum system.
E.g., in the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, probabilities – and thus the state vector
|Ψ〉 – represent an agent’s degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of
physical systems [17]. As a result, within the Bayesian approach the equality (17) would not be
right since its left-hand side would be objective while its right-hand side would be subjective. In
more detail, gathering data allows the agents to update their probability assignments (by using
Bayes’ theorem); so, the probability P[x = 1] always depends on the agents’ prior probabilities as
well as on the data and therefore can be different for agents in possession of the same data. 7 On
the other hand, the proposition X is the statement that in the measurement of the observable x
the outcome 1 occurs. Accordingly, the truth value of the proposition X is a fact for any agent.
Finally, the equality (17) gives rise to the problem of the emergence of bivalence from many-valued
logics. Indeed, if this equality holds as a general principle and hence the logic underpinning the
reality is infinite-valued, then the question is, how does a two-valued semantics emerge from an
infinite-valued semantics during the process of verification?
To describe the emergence of the logical bivalent limit, one can use clues suggested in the paper [22].
Consider a quantum system and a set O of projection operators on the Hilbert space related to
the states for the system, namely, O = {Pˆqα, Pˆrβ}, where α = {1, . . . , n} and β = {1, . . . ,m}, such
that some projection operators of O are incompatible, that is, [Pˆqα, Pˆrβ ] ≡ PˆqαPˆrβ − PˆrβPˆqα 6= 0.
7As stated by Bayesian approach to probability theory, probabilities are degrees of belief, not facts. Probabilities
cannot be derived from facts alone. Two agents who agree on the facts can legitimately assign different prior
probabilities. In this sense, probabilities are not objective, but subjective (see, e.g., [18, 19, 20, 21]).
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The incompatibility of the projection operators Pˆqα and Pˆrβ means that if the system is prepared,
say, in the state |Ψq〉 where all the propositions Qα comes out bivalent, then the truth values of the
propositions Rβ cannot be two-valued in |Ψq〉: To be exact, |Ψq〉 /∈ ran(Pˆrβ), so [[Rβ ]]v 6= 1; also,
|Ψq〉 /∈ ker(Pˆrβ), thus [[Rβ ]]v 6= 0.
Clearly, had the commutator [Pˆqα, Pˆrβ] been equal to 0, the propositions Qα and Rβ would have
become bivalent in the prepared state |Ψq〉. In view of that, the logical bivalent limit can be un-
derstood as a deformation of a non-commutative algebra and a limit ~→ 0.
Explicitly, assume that the noncommutative observables q and r have discrete spectrums {qα} and
{rβ} such that for their operators qˆ and rˆ one can write qˆ =
∑n
α qαPˆqα and rˆ =
∑m
β rβPˆrβ . Along
these lines, in the limit ~ → 0 the commutation relation between the operators qˆ and rˆ can be
presented in the following form
[qˆ, rˆ] 6= 0
~→0
−→
n∑
α
m∑
β
qαrβ[Pˆqα, Pˆrβ ] = i~{q, r} +O(~
2) , (18)
where {q, r} denotes the classical counterpart of the commutator [qˆ, rˆ].
At this point it is worth observing that in any attempt to go beyond formal considerations and
rigorously prove lim~→0[Pˆqα, Pˆrβ] = 0 for any indices α and β, the mathematical properties of the
operators Pˆqα and Pˆrβ may play a crucial role. Thus, only particular choices of the projection
operators Pˆqα and Pˆrβ might be suitable for rigorous arguments concerning the emergence of the
logical bivalent limit.
Then again, one can imagine that a bivalent semantic only nearly emerges at the end of the mea-
surement process when the size of the combined system, which includes the quantum interference
experiment, the detectors, and the entire macroscopic environment, becomes infinitely large. In
this way, the logical bivalent limit could be an idealization reserved for the limit where the size of
the system is infinite, which can be symbolically denoted by “the limit N →∞”.
However, as it can be shown (see, for example, [23]), such a limit is just a special case of the limit
~→ 0. That is, mathematically speaking, the nature of the idealization involved in assuming that
a system is infinitely large is much the same as that of assuming ~ → 0 in a quantum system of
a finite size. Accordingly, the observation about the difficulties of proving that the commutator
[Pˆqα, Pˆrβ] comes to be 0 as ~ approaches 0 regards the limit N →∞ as well.
5 Introducing supervaluationism in quantum mechanics
It must be noted, however, that none of the offered above objections to the equality (17) can be
considered decisive.
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Even so, a way to avoid at least some of those objections might be in the acknowledgment that in
quantum mechanics truth values of the future non-certain events simply do not exist.
Such could be if any lattice element different from the least and the greatest elements carries no
truth values, that is,
{v (∗) | ∗ 6= 0L and ∗ 6= 1L} = ∅ whereas v(0L) = 0 and v(1L) = 1 . (19)
Along the lines of this assumption, prior to the verification, an object S = {⋄} of a formal lan-
guage to which an element of L(H) other than the {0}-subspace and the identical subspace H is
attributed, should not be called a proposition – i.e., a primary bearer of truth-value – but a propo-
sitional formula or a sentence or anything that carries no intrinsic meaning of truth or falsehood.
Only subsequent to the act of verification, i.e., when the image of ⋄ under the valuation comes to
be either 1 or 0, one can call the aforesaid object a proposition. 8
Let’s take, for example, a system whose state before the verification is given by a quantum super-
position of the type |Ψ〉 = c1|Ψx1〉+c2|Ψx2〉 such that |Ψx1〉 ∈ ran(Pˆx1) and |Ψx2〉 ∈ ran(Pˆx2) where
ran(Pˆx1) and ran(Pˆx2) are closed subspaces of H that have no element in common except {0}, and
c1, c2 are the superposition coefficients. The subspaces ran(Pˆx1) and ran(Pˆx2) are identified with
simultaneously testable but disjoint (i.e., mutually exclusive) properties of the system, possession
of which are declared by the propositional formulas X1 and X2 associated with the orthogonal
projection operators Pˆx1 and Pˆx2.
It is straightforward that the superposition c1|Ψx1〉 + c2|Ψx2〉 would correspond to the direct sum
of ran(Pˆx1) and ran(Pˆx2) bringing in a decomposition of H, namely,
H = ran(Pˆx1)⊕ ran(Pˆx2) = {c1|Ψx1〉+ c2|Ψx2〉} . (20)
On the other hand, given that the meet of the orthogonal projections Pˆxi is ⊓
2
i=1Pˆxi = Pˆx1Pˆx2 =
Pˆx2Pˆx1 = 0, the direct sum (20) would correspond to the projection Pˆx1+ Pˆx2 and, hence, the join
⊔2i=1Pˆxi.
In accordance with the definition (14), one gets then
v
(
ran(Pˆx1) ∩ ran(Pˆx2)
)
= v
(
⊓2i=1Pˆxi
)
= [[X1∧X2]]v , (21)
v
(
{c1|Ψx1〉+ c2|Ψx2〉}
)
= v
(
⊔2i=1Pˆxi
)
= [[X1∨X2]]v . (22)
8This is reminiscent of the logical system of intuitionistic logic that lacks a complete set of truth values because
its semantics is specified in terms of provability conditions.
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Consistent with the assumption (19), {v(Pˆxi)} = ∅ at the same time as v(ran(Pˆx1) ∩ ran(Pˆx2)) =
v({0}) = 0 and v({c1|Ψx1〉+ c2|Ψx2〉}) = v(H) = 1, which would give
{[[Xi]]v} = ∅ , (23)
[[X1∧X2]]v = 0 , (24)
[[X1∨X2]]v = 1 . (25)
Accordingly, ahead of the verification, the sentence “Out of two contradictory properties, the system
possesses one or the other, but not both” would be true (and thus it would be a proposition) despite
the fact that the sentence “Out of two contradictory properties, the system possesses a particular
one” would have no truth value at all (implying that before the verification the truth degree func-
tions of the logical connectives F¬([[Xi]]v), F∧([[X1]]v, [[X2]]v) and F∨([[X1]]v, [[X2]]v) would not be
defined on [[Xi]]v).
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Nevertheless, provided a probability assignment for the latter sentence is possible in a way that
{[[Xi]]v} = ∅ =⇒ 0 < P[Xi] < 1 , (26)
the probability that this sentence will be proved to be true given the particular property i ∈ {1, 2}
can be estimated by P[Xi] = 〈Ψ|Pˆxi|Ψ〉 = |ci|
2 where |c1|
2 + |c2|
2 = 1.
As a rule, H 6= ({c1|Ψx1〉+c2|Ψx2〉} and so in general {[[X1∨X2]]v} = ∅ along with {[[X1∧X2]]v} = ∅.
This implies that prior to the verification the law of alternatives, i.e., P[X1 ∨X2] = P[X1] + P[X2],
would not be valid on the whole.
So, essentially, the supervaluationist assumption (19) suggests that in the scope of orthodox quan-
tum mechanics and a related quantum logic, one should – to paraphrase the remark made in the
paper [25] – focus on maps from the family L(H) to the unit interval [0, 1] that generalize the
classical idea of probability, rather than that of truth.
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9This inference concurs with the conclusion drawn in the paper [24] arguing that the major transformation from
classical to quantum physics lies in the shift from intrinsic to extrinsic properties. In consequence, a compound
property such as X∨Y may have a truth value, even though neither X nor Y has one.
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